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1. Introduction 
Evidentia.l rea..'>oning in ex pert systems has often used ad-hoc uncertainty calculi. Although it is 
generally accepted that probability theory provides a firm theoretical fo undat ion, researchers have 
found some problems with its usc as a workable uncertainty calculus. Among these problems arc 
representation ol' ignorance, consistency of probabilistic judgements, and adjustment of a priori 
judgements with experience. The application of metaprobability theory to evidential reasoning is a new 
approaeh to solving these problems. We use the Dempstcr-Shafer theory, an altcrnativP theory of 
evidential reasoning to judge mctaprobability theory as a theory of evidential reasoning. This pap<>r 
will compare how metaprobability theory and Dcmpster-Shafer theory handle the adjustment of 
judgements with experience. 
Section 2 and 3 describe the basics of the metaprobability and Dempster-Shafer theories. 
Mctaprobability theory deals with higher order probabilities applied to evidential ren.'>oning. 
Dempster-Shafer theory is a generalization of probability theory which has evolved from a theory of 
upper�.a.nd lower probabilities. 
Section 4 describes a thought experiment and the metaprobability and Dempstcr-Shafer ·analysis of 
the experiment. The thought experiment focuses on forming beliefs about a die from evidence accrued 
from two sensors: an odd-even sensor, a'nd a large-small sensor. For a large number of tosses, the odd­
even sensor sees half the tosses come up even, and the other half come up odd. For a different set of 
tosses of the same number, the large-small sensor sees half the tosses come up large and the other half 
small. Based on these two pieces of evidence, what should be the beliefs about the die? 
2. Metaprobability Theory 
Metaprobability theory deals with probability measures on the space of first-order probability 
distributions. In turn, the first-order distributions are defined over some domain state-space. In the 
field of probability theory, metaprobability has been known as "higher order probability" or 
"hierarchical probability". However, it is more appropriate to refer to the application of higher order 
probability to evidential reasoning as metaprobability because the order of the probability distribution 
eorresponds to the order of the meta-levei at which the probability theory is attempting to provide a 
quantifiable model of the evidential accrual process. 
Many theorists have considered it only briefly due to the lack of practical applications to rnot.ivatc 
the usc of metaprobabilities as well as a lack of computational resources to implerrwnt t.hcrn. We 
believe that evidential reasoning is an appropriate application of metaprobabilitics and t.hat the 
computational problem can be overcome with current technology. 
Figure I shows gives an example. The domain state-space is the set of (heads, tails ). Th<> spac'<' of' 
consiste nt probability distributions consists of those such that p(heads) + p(t.ails) =: l. Two dilf<'r<'nt. 
Ill(' I a probabi I ity distri lw tions are shown. The flat distri but. ion rcpresen t.s extreme ig;nora n<'<' about. t. his 
si tuat ior1. The other d istri bu Lion represents know ledge that the coin is most probably "fair". 
Ther<' are no theoretical qu<'stions al LIH' level of the ma.t.hcrnatiea.l formalism sinec' nwtaprobahiliLy 
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Figu.rf' I: Metaprobability Examples 
theory ha ... 'i the same mathematical fou nda.Lions as probability theory. "Operations with probabilities of 
the second level are determined entirely by the rules of operations with probabilities of the first level" 
[Rcic�.nbach 1949'f. However, there are important philosophical issues and methodological issues. The 
philos-<Yphieal issues arc concerned mainly with the psychological and logical validity of 
met.aprobabilities. The methodological tssues are concerned mainly with controlling the· combinatorics 
of met.aprobability state spaces. 
Met.a.probabilistic updating of beliefs given evidence ts based on a straight-forward application of 
Bayes rule: 
MLPD { p I E' s} = K . MLPD { E I p ' s} ·MLPD {p I s} 
p - first. �rdcr probability distribution 
E - experi1henta.l evidence 
S - prior information 
K= 1 MLPD {E I S} 
MLPD {p I S} dcnot<'s the prior nwt.;t-level distribution and MLPD {p I E, S} denotes the posterior 
dist.ribut.ion. TIH� AlLPD {E I p, S} is a mea.'iure of the likelihood of a particular body of evidence, 
giv<•n a p:ntieular urHkrlying first-orckr disLribut.ion. The ev aluation of this term is simple. For 
I'Xampl<·, if' E is an ol>sNvcd odd throw, the sample space is the sides of a die, and we a.rc p;iv<'n a. 
part.icula.r probability <knsity p =-"-{P (I },p (2),p (:J),p (4),p (5),p (6)}, then the value of MLPD {odd 
throw I p, S} is just p(l) + p(;l) + p(f>). 
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3. Dempster-Shafer Theory 
Development of the Dcm pster-Sh afer theory was started by Arth 11 r Dempster [Dempster I 9fi7] and 
extended by Glenn Shafer !Shafer, 1976]. Many artificial intelligence researchers have turned to this 
theory in the hope of avoiding the pitfalls of using probability theory in evidential reasoning. 
Dernpstcr-Shafer theory is a generali�ation of probability theory with its roots in a theory of upper and 
lower probabilities. Consequently, some of the importan t ideas in the theory can be thought of in 
terms of upper and lower probabilities. We give a brief description of the theory. 
Let 8 be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions about. a domain . 8 is called the 
frame of discernment. Let 28 denote the set of all subsets of 8. Subsets of 8 arc the propositions with 
which the theory is concerned. As a matter of convention, A and B will denote subsets of a frame ot' 
discernment. 
We define three functions: the basic probability a._<;signment m, the belief function Bel, and the 
plausibility function Pl. These functions have the same domain and range. Their domain is 28 and 
their range is [0, 1]. 
A "ba.<;ie probability assignment" ( m ) must meet these constraints : 
I) m (0) = 0 2) � m (A)= 1 
Ace 
The "belief" function can be defined in terms of a ba.<;ic probabil ity a.'>Signrnent m by: 
Bel(A)= I; m(B) 
BCA 
The "plausibility" function can be defined in terms of a belief function Bel by: 
Pl(A) =I- Bel(A) where A is the complement of A . 
Each of the three functions carries the same information. That is, there is a unique one-to-one 
transformation between any of the functions. However each function has a unique interpretation. The 
"basic probability assignment" of a subset of 8 can be interpreted as the probability mass constrained 
to stay in the subset. The "belief" of a subset of 8 can be interpreted as the measure of the lower 
probability of the subset, that is the minimum probability mass in the subset. And the "plausibility" 
of a subset of 8 is the upper probability of the subset, that is the maximum probability mass in the 
subset. 
A focal clement A of a frame of discernment 8 is a subset of 8 such that m (A) > 0. The union of 
the focal clements of a belief function is called its core. 
-
Frames of discernment can be made to distinguish finer and coarser concepts by processes called 
refining and coarsening. A frame of discernment 0 is a refinement of another frame 8 if there exists 
refining function w such that: 
1) w({O}) f:. 0 for V (} E 8 
2) w( { o}) n w ( { o' } ) = 0 if o f:. d 
3) U w( {0}) = !l 
o.-e 
Given a frame of discernm<'nt n, a frame of discernment 8, a refining function w from 8 ton, and a. 
belief function Bel over 8 we defl ne Bel 0 to be the vacuous extension of Bel : 
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Bel (A)=: max Bel0(B) 
LJ ce. �UJ )cA 
The vacuous extension of a belief function can be interpreted as the belief funcLion in the refined frame 
which places only the constraints explicitly required by the belief fundion in the coarsened frame. 
All belief funetions are ela..'"lsified into two claRscs: support functions, and quasi-support fundions. 
Quasi-support funetions arc those belief functions which have all of their probability maBscs on sets 
which are mutually exclusive. QuaRi-support functions contain the set of probability mass fundions. 
Support functions arc those belief funetions which Shafer believes "constitutes the subclass of belief 
functions appropriate for the representation of evidence". Support functions are dell ned by those belief 
functions whose core haR a positive mass function. What this means is that every subset in th<' frame 
of discernment ha.'"l a lower probability Bel which is strictly less than its upper probability Pl. 
Given two belief functions over the same frame of discernment but based on distinct bodies of 
evidence, Dempster's H.ule of Combination can be used to compute a new belief function based on the 
combined evidence. Dempster's B.ule of Combination is defined by: 
m (A ) = k 
· 
E m 1 ( B d · m A B '2) 
(!JinlJ2=A) 
4 .  Experiment 
We present a thought experiment designed to compare how metaprobability theory and Dempster­
Shafcr theory update beliefs with evidence. The experiment is as follows: 
"We are given a normal six-sided die and two sensors. One sensor can sense whether the top face of 
the die is odd or even. The other sensor can sense whether the top face of the die has four or more 
spots (large) or has three or less spots (small). We throw the die a large number of times with the 
odd-even sensor watching. The sensor reports that in exactly half the throws the die carne up even and 
in the other half it carne up odd. We throw the die the same number of times as before with the 
large-small sensor watching. The sensor reports that exactly half of the throws were large and half 
were small. What arc our beliefs about the outcome of next throw of the die given we can distinguish 
between the six outcomes?" 
Mctaproba.bility Results 
We have calculated the results of a simulated die throwing experiment using the meta.probability 
updating rule. We assumed a. uniform prior MLPD, i.e. given any two first order probability 
distributions p and q, we initially assume that MLPD (p) = MLPD ( q ). We use a simple updating 
rule based on Bayes Rule to update the evidence. Figure 2 shows the updating process. 
In order to simulate probability distributions in a machine environment, it is necessary to choose a 
discreti�ation of the interval [0,1] . We initially chose a coarse quantization into sixths for the first order 
probability distributions. That is, every probability mass is restricted to the values 0, 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 
'2ja, 5/6, or 1. Discretizations by twelfths and eighteens given the same problem, priors, and evidence, 
yielded analogous results to those described below. 
The experimental results show that in the limit (i.e. the number of tosses approaches infinity) the 
updated MLPD will consist of the distributions which meet the obvious "constraints" suggested by the 
evidence on odd-even and small-large probabilities. These consLraints arc: 
p(l) + p(2) + p(:3) = .5 
p(1) + p(;>) + p(t>) = .5 
p(l) + p(3) + p(5) = .5 
p(2) + p(4) + p(6) = .5 
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Fig � re 2: Metaproba.bi liLy Analysis 
Wit.h r<:sfwd. tq_ the chosen discrdization (i.e. 0, l/6, ... , 5/6, I), there are thirty first-order 
distrilJilt.ions for w-hich this holds. A few examples arc given below. ( Not.e that p(l) + p(:3) is always 
Pquai_To p (1) + p ({i).) A given row in the list is to be interpretPd as the values for a first-order 
distribution. 
sample space 
l 2 3 1 5 6 
aj6 0 0 3/6 0 0 
2/6 0 l/6 2/6 0 1/6 
1/6 2/6 0 1/6 2/6 0 
0 3/6 0 0 3/6 0 j, 
Of the thirty distributions, sixteen distributions meet the constraint 
p(l) + p(a) = p(1) + p(6) = .5 . Nine of the distributions meet the constraint p(l) + p(3) = 2/6, 
four meet the constraint p (1) + p (3) = 1/6, and one distribution meets the constraint 
p(l) + p(3) = 0. 
D<'rnpst<'r-ShafPr f{esults 
We hav<' d<>t.errnined the results of the experiment using the Dcmpster-Shafcr approach. The 
approach w<· t.a ke ii-i first to usc the statistical estimation technique presented by Shafer [Shafer, 1975] 
on thP franli'S of dis cern ment {odd, even} and {small, large} to create belief funetions for the two 
<'XJ><'rin)(•rtt.s. ThP two belief functions arc� then refined to the eomrnon frame of discern ment {1 2 :J 1 5 
I>} and I'OIII hi 111•d using D('lll psi er's l tulc of Corn bi nation to prod uee a bcliPf fu ndion which i� based on 
t hi' <'<>lnl>ilwd <·vid<'IH'<'. Figttr<' ;� shows Uw process ckseribed. 
Tlw li rst st<·p is t.lll' statistical Pst.imat.ion Lechniqll<' on (he• frai!H's of discnnnwnt {odd, even} and 
{srrl:l!l, l:ir!!;<' } . In till' li1niL, (i.<·. a.-; the· nurnlH'r of trials go<'s to in f i nit.y ) tlw ha.o;;ie probability 
:t.o.;si!!;l1 111<'111 s ('Oil \'<'r!!;(' to: 
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F'igur� 3: Dempster-Shafer Analysis 
rn(odd) = .5, rn(even) = .5 
rn(large) = .5, m(small) = -5 
The interpretation of the results is that there is no doubt about the die with respect to odd-even and 
small-large. The probability masses on each set are exactly .5. That is, Bel (A ) = PI (A ) = .5 for 
A E{odd, even, large, small}. This feature places these basic probability assignments in the category of 
qua.'>i-support functions. These results are intuitive . As the number of trials gets large, one should 
eventually be content that the die is fair' with respect to· these attributes. 
The second step is the refinement of the two quasi-support functions to a common frame .of 
discernment. This is done by first defining the refining functions w0,, and wu., where: 
W .2{odd tucn}-+ '){l:?:ll!'•6} W•-: 2{/argr.sma//}-+ 2{12:J156 } or. • � UJ 
W0t : {odd } -+ {I :3f> } 
w,, :even -+ {21t>} 
Wts : {large } -+ { 156 } 
Wts: {small} -+ { 12:3 } 
Secondly, we a.ssUIIH' that thP way to transfer the quasi-support functions to a <·ornmon fra.rn<' of 
disecrnnwnt is by vaeuous PXLI'nsion. The' results of Lhis step are: 
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odd-<'V<'n cxperim<mt: 
largc•-srn:dl experiment: 
m(1,3,5) = .5, m(2,1,6) = .5 
m(1,5,6) = .5 , m(1,2,3) = .5 
TIH' third step is to combine the refined support functions using Dempster's Rule of Combination. 
Th!' n�snlts a.re: 
m(1,:3) = m(2) = m(1,6) = m(5) = .25 
Tl1e interpretation of these results is that there is no uncertainty about the probability ma.'is on "2" 
and "f>", i.P., their probability masses arr exactly .25! This is certrtinly not intuitive. 
If a large but finite number of tosses arc considered instead of the limiting Cll..'>e, we can approximate 
Lhe resu Its of the statistical estimation procedure by: 
m18 (large ) = .5-!.... 
2 
£ m0, (odd)= .5-2 
£ m18 (small)= .5-
2 
m (even ) = .5 - !.... , Ot 
2 
Coing through the same process of refinement, vacuous extension, and Dempster's Hulc of 
Combination, we arrive at the results: 
m (2) = m (5) = m (1,3) = m (4,6) = (.5- � f 
m(1,2,3) = m(4,5,6) = m(1,3,5) = m(2,4,6) = (.5- �) ·£ 
m (e)= £2 
The corresponding support functions and plausibility functions for the singleton sets, (ignoring terms of 
o ( £'2)) arc: 
fori=1,3,4,6: S(i)= O 
for i =2,5: S (i) = .25 - £ 
2 
[>. Analysis of Experimental Results 
PI ( i) = .25 + !.... 
2 
PI ( i) = .25 + !.... 
2 
·In this section we analyze the experimental results from met.aprobability theory and Dempstcr-Shafer 
t!H•ory. Although both theories recognize the inherent symmetries of (2, 5) and (1, 3, 4, 6), the 
similarities between the results arc few. In general, mctaprobability theory seems better fitted for this 
type of analysis. This is not surprising and perhaps even a little bit unfair since it is gener:tlly 
reeogn iz<'d that probability theory is well-suited for what is essentially a statistical estimation prohlcrn. 
WP will first discuss the metaprobability results and then the Dempster-Shafcr results. 
We are satisfied with the results of metaprobability and the correctness of our method. The 
llH'Laprohahilit.y results have the interpretation that only first-order distributions which meet Ltw 
implicit eonstmints have a positive rnctaprobability ITHl..'lS. This seems rea.'ionable. The prior 
distril>ut ion does not rc•ally play a major role in this analysis sinee we have considered the limiting; <·ase 
(i.<•. alll<>tlnt of evidence goes to infinity). l lowever, the prior meta-distribution does allow us to inC"Iud<· 
ou r prior I>Piiefs about. a "normal" die. If we believe that a "normal" die is "fair", it would be <';J..o.;y to 
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encode this in the prior distribution. Given a prior , the metaprobability analysis will give reasonable 
results not only for the limiting case but also for any finite amount of evidence. We believe that 
metaprohability provides solutions to many of the traditional problems with using probability in 
evidential reasoning including the problem of representing ignorance. A potential drawback is the 
amount of computation required. 
On the other ha.nd, the results of applying Dempster-Shafer theory are counter-intuitive. One of the 
key ;tt.Lributes of Dernpster-Shafer is its ability to represent ignorance. However, application of 
Dr:rnpster's H ule of Combination results in precise beliefs on the events {2 5} when ignorance should 
still be present. The problem is due to the requirement of Dempster's Rule for distinct and 
independent bodies of evidence. Although the two bodies of experimental evidence arc based on 
independent observations of independent Losses, the tosses originate from the same underlying source of 
uncertainty. This violates the "distinct and independent '' criterift . 
5. Conclusions 
We believe that some generalization of probabilistic reasoning is necessary for evidential reasoning. 
Our work ha.'l shown that the usc of mctaprobability is a reasonable generalization. Dempster-Shafcr 
on the other hand, gives counter-intuitive results and needs further clarification with respect to 
in ferenee, 
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